THE EROSION OF MENS REA IN
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS
Ruth Ann Weidel*, John R. Mayo**and F. Michael Zachara***
INTRODUCTION

The basic premise that mens rea is required to establish criminal liability is supported by the Latin maxim "actus not facit reum
nisi mens sit rea (an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is
guilty)." ' The enactment and judicial interpretation of criminal
environmental statutes, however, has eroded the traditional requirement of mens rea. This article will address the application of
the mens rea requirement as it relates to individuals and corporations in environmental criminal prosecutions. It posits that the
traditional criminal law definitions of mens rea, such as "willfully,"
"purposely" and "knowingly" have been significantly eroded in
environmental enforcement statutes. This result is caused by
legislative fiat and judicial interpretation and is attributable to society's heightened environmental awareness and attendant emphasis on criminalizing polluters' conduct.
Section I examines early cases which diluted the mens rea requirement under the so-called "responsible corporate officer"
doctrine in the context of public welfare statutes. Section II evaluates the trends in case law dealing with "knowing" violations of
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1 W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4, at 212 (1986). Mens rea is de-

fined as a guilty mind or a guilty or wrongful purpose. Id. In an effort to classify
the degree of mens rea existing in common and statutory law, the Model Penal Code
has established four groups of crimes based on mental culpability. These groups
include crimes requiring purpose, knowledge, recklessness and negligence. MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962).

1100

MENS REA

1101

environmental criminal statutes. Section III evaluates the mens
rea required by the dual knowledge requirement found in the
knowing endangerment provisions of environmental criminal
statutes. The use of the negligence standard in environmental
criminal statutes is examined in Section IV. Section V evaluates
strict liability provisions in environmental criminal statutes. The
doctrine of willful blindness or deliberate ignorance, which has
resulted in the further dilution of the mens rea requirement, is
evaluated in Section VI. Section VII examines the development
of the collective knowledge doctrine, which can also diminish the
mens rea requirement.
I.

THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE IN THE
CONTEXT OF PUBLIC WELFARE STATUTES

The development of regulatory statutes designed to protect
the public welfare has resulted in responsible corporate officials
being exposed to criminal liability even though they lack personal knowledge and did not personally participate in the illegal
act.2 This is an expansion of the accomplice liability doctrine
whereby a criminal defendant must affirmatively participate in
the criminal act to be convicted. 3 The impact of the responsible
corporate officer doctrine is that it dispenses with the traditional
mens rea requirement necessary to establish affirmative participation in the commission of the crime.4
United States v. Dotterweich5 is one of the earliest cases addressing a public welfare statute under which traditional standards of mens rea were diminished. In upholding the conviction
of the company president, Dotterweich, 6 under the criminal provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (the
Act),' the Supreme Court established what has become known as
the responsible corporate officer doctrine. 8 Although the district
2 1 K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 501 (1984).
3 Id. at § 509.

4 Id. at § 513.
5 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
6 Id. at 285. The charges in Dotterweich stemmed from activities of Dotterweich
and the Buffalo Pharmacal Company, which permitted adulterated or misbranded
drugs to be shipped in interstate commerce in violation of the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act. Id. at 279 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1938)).
7 21 U.S.C. § 331 (1938). The Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938
prohibits: "[t]he introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate commerce
of any . . . drug... that is adulterated or misbranded" and makes such conduct

punishable as a misdemeanor. Id.
8 Id. at 284-85.
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court acquitted the company, Dotterweich was convicted of ship9
ping misbranded and adulterated drugs in interstate commerce.
The court of appeals reversed the conviction, finding that only
the corporation fit within the statute's definition of a "person"
subject to prosecution. 10 Under this analysis, Dotterweich could
be prosecuted only if the company was a counterfeit corporation
serving as a screen for Dotterweich." The Supreme Court subsequently granted the government's petition for certiorari.'2
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court noted
that, in promulgating the Act, Congress was extending "the
range of its control over illicit and noxious articles" and had
"stiffened the penalties for disobedience" to provide stringent
protection in areas where the consequences of non-compliance
are great.13 In discussing the rationale for the responsible corporate officer doctrine, the Court stated that:
The prosecution to which Dotterweich was subjected is based
on a now familiar type of legislation whereby penalties serve as
effective means of regulation. Such legislation dispenses with
the conventional requirement for criminal conduct-awareness of some wrongdoing. In the interest of the larger good it
puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise
innocent but standing in responsible relation to a public
danger. 14
Based upon this analysis, the Court noted that a finding of guilt
can be supported anytime a drug is misbranded or adulterated even
though there is no conscious fraud.' 5 The Court found that the basis for establishing a corporate officer's personal liability depends
on whether or not the officer "shares responsibility in the business
process." 16 Weighing the hardship of imposing criminal liability on
a corporate officer, absent a finding of mens rea against the possible
harm to the public, the Court found that because the corporate officer is in a position to prevent the harm he should be penalized for
failing to do so.' 7
9 Id. at 278.
10 131 F.2d 500, 502-04 (2d Cir. 1942), rev'd, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
11 Id. at 503.
12 318 U.S. 753 (1943). The Court granted certiorari because the case raised
questions of importance in the enforcement of the Act. Id. at 279.

13 Id. at 280.
14 Id. at 280-81 (citing United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)).

15 Id. at 281.
16 Id. at
17 Id. at

284.

285. The dissent noted that "[i]n the absence of clear statutory authorization it is inconsistent with established canons of criminal law to rest liability on an
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In United States v. Park, 18 the United States Supreme Court further developed the responsible corporate officer doctrine by applying the doctrine in the context of a large national corporation.' 9
The Court in Park sustained the conviction of John Park, the chief
executive officer of Acme Markets, Inc. (Acme), for violating the
Act 2 ° by allowing food held for sale by the corporation to be contaminated by rodents.2 ' Thejury convicted Park based on his position as a corporate officer who failed to adequately perform his
duties as the individual with ultimate responsibility for maintaining
sanitary conditions. 2 2 The trial judge dismissed Park's argument
that the jury instructions failed to reflect the Supreme Court's decision in Dotterweich as well as failing to adequately define the term
"responsible relationship. ' 23
The court of appeals reversed Park's conviction and remanded
for a new trial, finding that the instructions may have given the jury
the impression that Park could be convicted absent even a showing
of "wrongful action" on his part. 24 The court, relying on its interpretation of Dotterweich, indicated that an element of wrongful action
still must be shown. 25 The Supreme Court granted certiorari26 "because of an apparent conflict among the Courts of Appeals" regarding the proper standard to be applied when assessing a corporate
officer's criminal liability under the Act. 2 7
In reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court determined that the trial court had not abused its discretion and that
"viewed as a whole and in context of the trial, the charge was not
misleading and contained an adequate statement of the law to guide
act in which the accused did not participate and of which he had no personal knowledge." Id. at 286 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
18 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
19 See Park, 421 U.S. at 660.
20 21 U.S.C. § 331(K) (1970).
21 Park, 421 U.S. at 660. Evidence was introduced indicating that Park was notified of the unsanitary conditions in the warehouse by the Food and Drug Administration. On cross-examination Park conceded that he had overall responsibility to
insure that the food sold to the public was stored under sanitary conditions. In
addition, he indicated that providing for sanitary food storage was a task he delegated to "dependable subordinates". Id. at 662-64.
22 See id. at 665-66.
23 Id. (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
24 United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839, 841-42 (4th Cir. 1974).
25 Id. at 841-42. The court of appeals interpreted Dotterweich as dispensing with
the need to prove "awareness of wrongdoing", but not with the need to prove
"wrongful action" to obtain a conviction under § 331 (K) of the Act. Id.
26 419 U.S. 922 (1974).
27 Id. at 667.
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the jury's determination. "28 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
relied on Dotterweich, noting that the Act imposes greater responsibility on corporate officers because of the act's underlying purpose
of protecting the public health.2 9 The Court indicated that the Act
eliminates the traditional mens rea requirement.3 0 Moreover, the
Court held that the Act imposed a duty on corporate officers to both
identify and remedy violations as well as insure that they do not
1
3

occur.

The Court determined that some measure of blameworthiness
can be inferred from the terms "responsible relationship" and "responsible share" as used in the responsible corporate officer doctrine.5 2 To establish the required mental state, however, the
prosecution need only establish that the officer's position in the corporation granted him the authority and responsibility to prevent or
promptly convert a violation. 3 Therefore the Court held that the
jury instructions properly allowed the jury to find the defendant
guilty if it determined that he was in a position of responsibility concerning the prevention of such violations.3 4
Although Dotterweich and Park deal with public welfare offenses
under the federal food and drug laws, the analyses of the responsible corporate officer doctrine and its effect on the enws rea requirement have been applied to environmental criminal cases. 3 5 This use
of the responsible corporate officer doctrine in environmental criminal cases is likely to increase as the government continues to pursue
Id. at 675.
Id. at 672 (citing United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
30 Id. at 672-73.
31 Id. at 672.
32 Id. at 673.
33 Id. at 673-74.
34 Id. at 674.
35 See United States v. Klehman, 397 F.2d 406 (7th Cir. 1986) (prosecution pursuant to the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-74 (1966));
United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 906-07 (2d Cir. 1978) (Park, 421 U.S.
658, and Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, cited as authority to support the proposition that
failure to perform a duty may be basis for liability under the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-11 (1976)); United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc., 602 F.2d
1123, 1130 n.l I (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980) (defendants' arguments that they could not be held individually liable were meritless based on Dotterweich and Park). But see United States v. White, No. CR-90-228 AAM, (E.D. Wash.
March 28, 1991). The district court held that a corporate officer must knowingly
participate in the violation of RCRA and FIFRA in order to be convicted. 21 Env't
Rep. (BNA) 2223-24 (April 12, 1991). The court noted that the responsible officer
doctrine could not be applied in cases where criminal intent must be shown. Id.
Therefore, either actual knowledge of the violation or accomplice liability must be
shown to convict under RCRA and FIFRA. Id.
28

29
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its aggressive enforcement program.3 6 As a result, environmental
prosecutors have a means for reducing the required mens rea, to convict corporate officers who do not have actual knowledge of the violation but are in a position to prevent or remedy a violation.
II.

KNOWING VIOLATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL
STATUTES

In a growing number of cases courts have diluted the traditional mens rea requirements by expanding what constitutes
"knowing" conduct under public welfare statutes, including environmental criminal laws. The courts, in applying this broader
definition of knowledge, have required that a person only have
knowledge of actions taken versus actual knowledge of the statute which prohibits those actions.
United States v. InternationalMinerals & Chemical Corp.37 is illustrative of this judicial trend of expanding the definition of "knowing" conduct under public welfare statutes. The Supreme Court
reversed the dismissal of the information, which charged the defendant with knowingly violating the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulations 38 promulgated pursuant to the U.S.
Code of Criminal Justice. 39 In International Minerals & Chemical
Corp., the defendant was charged with knowingly violating a regulation that prohibited the shipment of hazardous materials without shipping papers that indicate the hazardous nature of the
shipment.40 The Court held that "knowingly" in the statute pertains only to knowledge that the material shipped was hazardous-not to knowledge of the existence of the regulation.4 '
Specifically, the Court noted that "where ...dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that anyone who
is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with them
must be presumed to be aware of the regulation." 4 This expan36 See 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1534-35 (Dec. 7, 1990); 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 156465 (Dec. 14, 1990).

37 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
38 Id. at 565. The defendant allegedly violated 49 C.F.R. § 173.427 (1970).
39 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 559 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 834 (1970)). 18
U.S.C. § 834 (1970) provided in pertinent part that the I.C.C. shall have the authority to "formulate regulations for the safe transportation within the United States of

...corrosive liquids" and that anyone who "knowingly violates any such regulation" shall be guilty of a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 834(a), () (1970).
40 InternationalMinerals, 402 U.S. at 559.

41 Id. at 562-64.
42 Id. at 565. In applying this analysis, the Court relied on its decisions in
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sion of the definition of knowing conduct has also been applied
to environmental criminal cases.
In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.,43 the Johnson &
Towers company and two of its employees were convicted for the
illegal disposal of chemicals classified as hazardous waste under
44
the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
and pollutants under the Federal Clean Water Act 45 at its Mt.

Laurel, New Jersey plant.46 The company pumped these chemicals into a trench, which ultimately flowed into a tributary of the
Delaware River. 47 The company pled guilty to the charges, but
the employees pled not guilty and moved to dismiss the RCRA
charge on the grounds that the criminal provision of section
6928(d)(2)(A) 48 applied only to owners and operators of a facility; specifically, the statute applied to those obligated under the
statute to obtain a permit.4 9 The district court granted the employees' motion5 0 and denied the government's motion for
reconsideration. 5'
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that section 6928(d)(2)(A) covers employees in addition to
owners and operators "who knowingly treat, store or dispose of
any hazardous waste, but that the employees can be subject to
criminal prosecution only if they knew or should have known that
there had been no compliance with the permit requirement of
section 6925. "52 In analyzing the Congressional intent behind
United States v. Freed and United States v. Balint both of which addressed similar
mens rea issues. InternationalMinerals, 402 U.S. at 560-65 (citing Freed, 401 U.S. 601
(1971); Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)).
43 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
44 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). Specifically, the defendants were charged
with disposing of hazardous waste without a permit in violation of RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(d)(2)(A) (1982).
45 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
4
6Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 663-64.
47
48

Id. at 664.

42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (1982), a provision of RCRA, provides in pertinent

part:
Any person who ...
(2) knowingly treats, stores or disposes of any hazardous waste...
(A) without ... a permit . . . or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of
such permit . . .shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine . . .or
imprisonment ....
Id.4 9

Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664.

50
51

Id.

52

Id. at 664-65. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1982) requires in pertinent part that

Id.
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this provision of RCRA, the court noted that "[a]lthough Congress' concern may have been directed primarily at owners and
operators of generating facilities, since it imposed upon them in
section 6925 the obligation to secure the necessary permit, Congress did not explicitly limit criminal liability for impermissible
'
treatment, storage, or disposal to owners and operators.' 5
The court further noted that it would undermine the purpose of RCRA to limit the application of this section to owners
and operators when other employees also bear responsibility for
the handling of hazardous waste.5 4 The court then addressed the
question of the requisite proof necessary for a finding of guilt
under section 6928(d)(2)(A).5 5 The court found that because a
knowing violation of section 6928 (d)(2)(B) 56 is required:
[i]t is unlikely that Congress could have intended to subject to
criminal prosecution those persons who acted when no permit
had been obtained irrespective of their knowledge (under subsection (A)), but not those persons who acted in violation of
the terms of a permit unless that action was knowing (subsection (B)). 5 7
The court thus held that Congress either inadvertently omitted the
word "knowing" in section 6928(d)(2)(A) or intended that the term
"knowingly" which introduces section 6928(d)(2) would apply to
section 6928(d)(2)(A) as well. 5' Therefore, the court held that it
was necessary to show that the defendants knew they were acting
without a permit. 59 The Court limited its holding by noting that
under public welfare statutes the government is required to prove
only "knowledge of the actions taken and not knowledge of the statute forbidding them. ' 60 The court further conditioned its decision
by determining that where an industry is highly regulated, such as
"each person owning or operating a facility for the treatment, storage, or disposal
of hazardous waste ... have a permit .... "
53

Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 667.

54
55
56

Id.

57

Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.

58

Id.

Id. at 667-69.
See supra note 48 for pertinent text of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (1982).

59 Id. at 668-69.
60 Id. at 669 (citing United States v. International Minerals and Chemical Corp.,
402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971)). The Court in InternationalMinerals noted that "the principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies whether the law be a statute or
a duly promulgated and published regulation.... [W]e decline to attribute to Congress the inaccurate view that the Act requires proof of knowledge of the law, as
well as the facts, and that it intended to endorse that interpretation by retaining the
word 'knowingly.' ". Id.
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the hazardous waste industry, knowledge that Johnson & Towers
did not have a permit could be inferred. 6
In United States v. Hayes InternationalCorp.6 2 the court specifically
addressed the requisite level of knowledge required for a conviction
under RCRA.6 3 The court held that section 6928(d)(1) of RCRA is
a public welfare provision involving a heavily regulated industry and
is designed to protect the human health and safety.64 As a result,
the court asserted that knowledge of the regulation is imputed to
those who take part in the hazardous waste industry.6 5
In Hayes, the company, Hayes International Corp. (Hayes), and
one of its employees responsible for disposing of its hazardous
waste, Beasley, were convicted for violating RCRA when the disposal facility with whom Hayes had contracted illegally disposed of its
hazardous waste. 66 The court held that it was not a defense to claim
lack of knowledge of the specific requirements of the regulations.6 7
On appeal, the defendants raised three separate but interrelated arguments.8 They initially claimed that their violations were
not "knowing" because they did not understand the regulations. 6 9
Secondly, they asserted that they did not have knowledge regarding
Id.
786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986).
63 Id. at 1500 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) (1982)).
64 Id. at 1503.
65 In describing § 6928(d)(1), the court stated that:
[it is] undeniably a public welfare statute, involving a heavily regulated area with great ramifications for the public health and safety. As
the Supreme Court has explained it is completely fair and reasonable
to charge those who operate in such areas with knowledge of the regulatory provisions. Indeed, the reasonableness is borne out in this
case, for the evidence at trial belied the appellees' profession of ignorance. Accordingly, in a prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) it
would be no defense to claim no knowledge that the paint waste was a
hazardous waste within the meaning of the regulations; nor would it
be a defense to argue ignorance of the permit requirement.
Id. at 1503.
66 Id. at 1500-01. Hayes contracted with Performance Advantage, Inc. (Performance) to dispose of jet fuel and used solvents generated by Hayes' airplane refurbishing plant. Beasley negotiated the contract with Performance whereby
Performance would pay Hayes for the jet fuel and would remove the solvents at no
charge. Performance disposed of the used solvents illegally. Hayes and Beasley
were subsequently convicted on eight counts of violating RCRA.
67 Id. at 1502-03.
68 Id. at 1505.
69 Id. This mistake of law defense was based on the argument that the defendants had a good faith belief that because the waste was being sent to a recycler, it
was exempt from regulation.
61

62
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the status of the disposal facility permits.7 0 Finally, the defendants
argued that because they believed the disposal facility was recycling
the waste, RCRA had not been knowingly violated. 7
The court determined that knowledge of the specific RCRA
regulations was not required to sustain a conviction and held that
"ignorance of the regulatory status is no excuse." 7 2 In rejecting the
mistake of law defense, the court reiterated that because RCRA is a
public welfare statute designed to protect the public health and
safety, knowledge of the illegality is not an element of the crime. 7"
The court concluded that because Hayes operated a heavily regulated business, there was a presumption that the defendants had
knowledge of the pertinent regulations."
Rejecting the defendants' argument that the disposal company
had the proper permit, the court determined that based on congressional intent knowledge of the permit status is required.7 5 The
court, however, found that failure of a hazardous waste generator to
determine the status of a disposal facility's permit constitutes knowledge sufficient to find a violation of RCRA, and that such knowledge
could be proven with circumstantial evidence. 76 Thus, the court upheld the defendants' conviction determining that they knew or
should have known that the disposal company did not have the requisite permit. 77 The court concluded that based on negotiations between the parties it could be inferred that the defendants knew the
wastes were not being recycled.78
In United States v. Greer,79 the court expanded upon the concept
established in Hayes that knowledge of environmental statutes can
be imputed to the defendant. In Greer, the defendant was convicted
70 Id. The defendants argued that there was insufficient evidence showing that
they knew Performance did not have a permit.
71 Id. at 1505-06. The defendants argued that due to a mistake of fact they actually believed the waste was being recycled and therefore, they did not knowingly
violate RCRA.
72 Id. at 1505.
73 Id. at 1503-05.
74 Id. at 1504.
75 Id.
76 Id. In fact, circumstances such as an unusually low price for disposal or other
unusual circumstances may be used to infer knowledge of permit status. Id.
77 Id. at 1505.
78 Id. at 1506. The evidence adduced at trial indicated that the original deal
between Hayes and Performance specified that Performance would obtain jet fuel
and paint solvents from Hayes and recycle them. Performance subsequently indicated that it no longer wanted the paint solvents. The court held that, due to this
fact, the jury could infer that Hayes should have known that Performance had no
intention of recycling the paint solvents. Id.
79 850 F.2d 1447 (11 th Cir. 1988).
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of knowingly disposing of hazardous waste in violation of RCRA8 °
and failing to report the improper disposal in violation of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 8 t The conviction was based largely upon
circumstantial or inferential evidence.8 2 The defendant's motion for
judgment of acquittal was granted and the government appealed. 8 3
The facts adduced at trial indicated that Greer had previously
approved of and encouraged activities at his recycling facility which
resulted in dumping of hazardous wastes directly onto the ground.8 4
The court thus found that based on Greer's activities, the jury could
infer that Greer "knowingly disposed of or caused others to dispose
of" waste in violation of RCRA and CERCLA.8 5 The court also permitted the jury to infer that Greer, based on his previous experience, knew that dumping of that particular hazardous waste would
86
pose a risk of harm to others or the environment.
In United States v. Hoflin, 8 7 the Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit rejected the Third Circuit's interpretation of 42 U.S.C. section
6928(d)(2)(A) and (B) in Johnson & Towers, 88 by holding that in order
to sustain a conviction it is not necessary that the defendant know
that a permit is lacking.8 9 Hoflin ruled that although the criminal
penalty provisions generally require some degree of knowledge,
section 6928(d)(2)(A) does not require mens rea and is essentially a
strict liability criminal provision. 90 Consequently, a defendant may
be convicted simply by committing the act of discharging a hazardous substance without a permit, irrespective of the defendant's level
of knowledge. 9 ' In Hoflin, the defendant appealed his conviction for
aiding and abetting in the disposal of hazardous waste without a
80 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (1982).

81 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3) (1982).
82 Greer, 850 F.2d at 1451.
83 Id. at 1148.
84 Id. at 1451. This practice was employed to ensure compliance with Greer's
permit. With regard to the incident in question, although Greer did not directly
tell one of his employees to dump hazardous chemicals onto the ground, it was
alleged that he acquiesced in the decision. The court specifically found that "the
jury could infer from the context of the specific discussion [with the employee] that
when Greer instructed [the employee] to 'handle' the truckload of waste . . . he
effectively ordered him to dump it." Id. at 1452.
85 Id. at 1452.
86 Id.

87 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989).
88 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984); see supra notes 43-61 for text discussing theJohnson & Towers decision.
89 Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), (B) (1982)).
90 Id.
91 Id.
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permit in violation of 42 U.S.C. section 6928(d)(2)(A).9 2 The RCRA
violation occurred when Hoflin, director of a public works department, caused his subordinates to dispose of drums containing paint
by burying them at the city's sewage treatment plant.9 3
On appeal, Hoflin asserted that he was unaware that the city did
not have a permit to dispose of the paint. He argued that because
knowledge of the city's failure to obtain a permit was a. necessary
element of the offense charged, the failure to so instruct the jury was
reversible error.9" In reviewing Hoflin's challenge, the court focused upon the specific language of RCRA section 6928(d), which
provides in pertinent part:
Any person who ...
(2) knowingly treats, stores or disposes of any hazardous waste
identified or listed under this subchapter either (A) without having obtained a permit under § 6925 of this title... or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such permit ...

shall, upon conviction be subject to

[fines, imprisonment or both]. 9 5
Hoflin argued that "knowingly" in the above quoted section (2)
modifies both subsections (A) and (B). 96 Hoflin asserted that knowledge is an essential element of the crime defined by section
6928(d)(2)(A) and that he therefore could not be convicted without
proof that he knew the city had not obtained a permit.9 7
In analyzing the statute, the court stated:
The absence of the word "knowing" in subsection (A) is in
stark contrast to its presence in the immediately following subsection (B). The statute makes a clear distinction between
non-permit holders and permit holders, requiring in subsection (B) that the latter knowingly violate a material condition
or requirement of the permit. To read the word "knowingly"
at the beginning of Section (2) into subsection (A) would be to
eviscerate this distinction. Thus, it is plain that knowledge of
the absence of a permit is not an element of the offense defined by subsection (A).9 8
Id. at 1034 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (1982)).
Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1035. Prior to the disposal of the drums, the director of
the sewage treatment plant informed Hoflin that burying the drums may jeopardize
92
93

the plant's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.
Nonetheless, Hoflin ordered employees of his department to bury them. Id.
94 Id. at 1036.
95

Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) and (B) (1988) (emphasis added)).

96

Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1036.

97 Id. at 1036-37.
98 Id. at 1037.
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Thus, the court specifically found that the language of the statute was unambiguous."9 In finding that knowledge is not an element of the offense charged under subsection (B), the court relied
upon the apparently clear congressional intent to exclude knowledge from the statutory language.' 0 0 In addition, the court indicated that construing section 6928(d) (2) (A) to not require
knowledge is consistent with the highly regulated nature of hazardous waste and the general purpose of RCRA to protect human
health and the environment.' 0 ' Therefore, the court held that the
defendant could be convicted for a violation of RCRA without having any knowledge that a permit did not exist, provided that he was
10 2
aware the material was hazardous waste.
In United States v. Sellers,' 0 3 the defendant was convicted by a
jury of knowingly and willfully disposing of hazardous waste without
a permit in violation of section 6928(d)(2)(A) of RCRA.' 0 4 The district court instructed the jury as follows:
Although the government must prove that the waste disposed
of was listed or identified or characterized by the E.P.A. as a
hazardous waste, the Government is not required to prove
that the Defendant knew that the waste was a hazardous waste
within the meaning of the regulations. In other words, the
Government need only prove that the Defendant knew what
the waste was; that is paint and paint solvent waste...
On appeal, the defendant argued that the district court erred in
so instructing the jury.'0 6 The jury instruction requested by the defendant provided that to sustain a conviction, the government must
prove that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known
that the material was waste as defined by the regulations and that
the defendant knew that the waste could be harmful to persons or
0 7
the environment if disposed of improperly. l
In rejecting the defendant's argument, the court of appeals re99 Id.
100 Id.

at 1038.

101 Id.
102
103
104

Id. at 1038-40.
926 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1991).

Id. at 412. Sellers was convicted of disposing of sixteen 55-gallon drums of
methylethylketone and waste paint on the enbankment of a creek, which eventually
flows into the Leaf River in Mississippi. One of the drums was found to be leaking.
Sellers was subsequently indicted on sixteen counts of violating 42 U.S.C. § 6928

(d)(2)(A). Sellers was tried by ajury and convicted on all sixteen counts. He was
sentenced to 41 months imprisonment and fined nearly $7,000. Id. at 412-13.
105
106
107

Id. at 415.
Id. at 414-17.
Id. at 415.
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lied on International Minerals, ' 8 finding that the use of the word
"knowingly" in section 6928 (d)(2)(A) of RCRA did not extend to
knowledge of the regulation, but only to the hazardous nature of the
material in question.' 0 9 The court specifically noted, that "although
Congress required some mens rea by its use of the word knowingly in
the 'statute', knowledge of the regulation was not part of this mens
rea requirement .... [w]hen a person knowingly possesses an instrumentality which by its nature is potentially dangerous, he is imputed
with the knowledge that it may be regulated by public health
legislation." 'o
Sellers represents an expansion of the judicially recognized
premise that a jury can, in a prosecution under RCRA, infer guilt
from the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus in Sellers, thejury
was permitted to infer knowledge from the facts of both the hazardous nature of the substance disposed of and the regulations governing disposal."' In addition, the court held that the evidence
supported a finding that the defendant knew or reasonably should
have known that the material he was disposing of was an extremely
flammable paint solvent and that improper disposal was potentially
dangerous to humans and the environment." 2 Also, the court
noted that based upon this knowledge Sellers "no doubt" knew3 that
regulations existed governing the disposal of this substance."
III.

KNOWING ENDANGERMENT IN ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINAL CASES

The recent environmental statutory trend has been to
criminalize conduct that places another person "in imminent
danger of death or serious bodily injury." ' 1 4 This trend is referred to as the doctrine of "knowing endangerment." ' 15 To be
convicted under the knowing endangerment provisions of envi108 402 U.S. 558 (1971); see supra notes 37-42 for text addressing the International
Minerals decision.
109 Sellers, 926 F.2d at 415-16.
I lO Id. (citing United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S.
558 (1971)).
i1

Id. at 415-17.

112

Id.

''3

Id. at 417.

114 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988) (criminal penalty under Clean Water Act);

42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988) (criminal penalty under RCRA); Clean Air Act Pub. L.
No. 101-549, § 113(c)(5)(A), 104 Stat. 2399, 2676 (1990) (amending 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413 (1988)); 1990 N.J. Water Pollution Control Act-Enforcement (Clean Water
Enforcement Act), ch. 28, § 7(f)(4) (1990) (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10

(Supp. 1990)).

115 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3) (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988).
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ronmental statutes, the defendant must possess the requisite
level of knowledge required to constitute a criminal violation of
the statute as well as knowledge at the time of the violation that
the illegal conduct places another person in imminent danger of
death or serious bodily injury.'" 6 In enacting the knowing endangerment provisions of RCRA, Congress intended to penalize
only those persons who actually knew that their conduct placed
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily
injury."I7 The required knowledge under knowing endangerment provisions may be established through direct or circumstantial evidence, but not by either constructive or vicarious

knowledge. 118
In United States v. Protex Industries, Inc., 1 9 a corporation was
convicted for violating the knowing endangerment section of
RCRA,' 2 ° based on conduct that could reasonably be expected to
cause serious bodily injury rather than on knowledge that the injury was likely.12' As part of its business, Protex operated a drum
recycling facility that purchased and reconditioned used drums
previously containing hazardous chemicals. 122 These drums
were cleaned, repainted and subsequently used to store and ship
116 See supra note 102.
117 See H. REP. No. 1444, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE

& ADMIN. NEWS 5028, 5036-38. Because the knowing endangerment provisions of other federal and New Jersey statutes are identical to that in RCRA, it is
reasonable to apply the same legislative purpose to those knowing endangerment
provisions.
118 Id. at 5037.
1 19 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir. 1989).
120 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988) provides:
(e) Knowing endangerment
Any person who knowingly transports, treats, stores, disposes of, or
exports any hazardous waste . . . who knows at that time that he
thereby places another person in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury, shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more
than $250,000 or imprisonment for not more than fifteen years, or
both. A defendant that is an organization shall, upon conviction of
violating this subsection, be subject to a fine of not more than
$1,000,000.
121 United States v. Protex Indus., 874 F.2d at 741-44. The first conviction of an
individual under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) occurred in United States v. Tumin, 2 Toxics
L. REP. 1399 (BNA) (E.D.N.Y. 1988). Tumin came under suspicion when it was
reported to the Drug Enforcement Administration that he purchased three 55-gallon drums of ethyl ether known to be used in cocaine production. Tumin was subsequently convicted of abandoning the ether in a residential neighborhood in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988). The abandonment of the ether was found
to create a grave danger of injury to human health and the environment.
122 Protex Indus., 874 F.2d at 741.
CONG.
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products manufactured by Protex. 123 As a result of RCRA violations, Protex was convicted for placing three of its employees in
imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury in violation of
RCRA's knowing endangerment provision.' 2 4
Protex appealed this conviction, arguing that its conduct did
not place its employees in imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury but rather, subjected the employees to solvent
poisoning that is largely reversible and therefore, not "serious."' 2 5 The court rejected this argument in view of evidence
that not only had the employees been placed in danger of serious
bodily injury, but also that they had suffered serious bodily injury.' 2 6 Protex also challenged the district court's jury instructions, based on the court's definition of "imminent danger" as
"the existence of a condition or combination of conditions which
could reasonably be expected to cause death or serious bodily
injury unless the condition is remedied."' 1 27 Protex argued that
the court's substitution of the term "reasonable expectation" for
the statutory language of "substantial certainty" rendered the
statute unconstitutionally vague as applied. 12 8 The court noted
that the trial court actually instructed the jury with language derived directly from section 6928(f)(1)(C) and that the jury instructions were a foreseeable expansion of the knowing
endangerment provision.' 2 9 The court explained that "the 'substantially certain' standard appears to define the mens rea necessary for commission of the crime, rather than the degree to which
a defendant's conduct must be likely to cause death or serious
Id.
Id. at 741-42. The government contended that employees were subjected to
significant solvent exposure without adequate safety precautions. Evidence adduced at trial showed that Protex's safety provisions for its employees were "woefully inadequate to protect the employees against the dangers of toxic chemicals."
Id. at 742.
125 Id. at 742-43.
126 Id. at 743.
127 Id. at 744.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 744. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(f)(1) (1988) provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of subsection (e) of this section
(1) A person's state of mind is knowing with respect to (A) his conduct, if he is aware of the nature of his conduct;
(B) an existing circumstance, if he is aware or believes that the circumstance exists; or
(C) a result of his conduct, if he is aware or believes that his conduct
is substantially certain to cause danger of death or serious bodily
injury.
123
124
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bodily injury.""M0 Therefore, where a reasonable expectation of
harm exists, a defendant should be aware that its conduct is unlawful.' 3 ' Further, the court found that Protex should have
known that its conduct was violative of RCRA and that this idea
was adequately conveyed to the jury.' 32
United States v. Borowski 133 represents the first knowing endangerment conviction under the Federal Clean Water Act
(CWA).

134

Borjohn Optical Technology, Inc. and its president

were convicted of violating the CWA's knowing endangerment
provision' 3 5 because they ordered employees to dump toxic
waste water into the public sewer system, thereby placing the emdeath or serious bodily injury by
ployees in imminent danger of
36
exposure to these chemicals. 1

IV.

NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINAL STATUTES

Although environmental statutes generally criminalize only
knowing or willful conduct, various environmental statutes also
criminalize negligent actions.' 37 Thus, the mens rea required to
sustain a conviction under these statutes is significantly less than
that traditionally required.'

38

For example, the CWA1 39 estab-

130 Protex Indus., 874 F.2d at 744.

131 Id.
132 Id.

The court stated:

The gist of the knowing endangerment provision of the RCRA is that
a party will be criminally liable if, in violating other provisions of the
RCRA, it places others in danger of great harm and it has knowledge
of that danger. The district court conveyed this same idea to the jury
in its instructions. The court rejected appellant's argument that it
could not be aware that its behavior was prohibited by the "knowing
endangerment" provision of the RCRA.
Id.
133 5 Toxics L. REP. 21 (BNA) (D. Mass. 1990).
134 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
135 Id. at § 1319(c)(3).
136 Borowski, 5 Toxics L. REP. at 21. The employees were primarily illiterate Polish immigrants. Id.
137 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1) (1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10A-10(f) (West 1982
& Supp. 1990) (Water Pollution Control Act); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-9(i) (West
Supp. 1990) (Solid Waste Management Act). In United States v. Oxford Royal
Mushroom Prods., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Pa. 1980), the court noted that "the
mens rea required for negligent conduct and that required for willful conduct cannot
be viewed as entirely distinct." Id. at 857.
138 As noted in United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985), "the existence of mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of AngloAmerican jurisprudence." Id. at 1123 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 500 (1951)).
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lishes criminal penalties for negligent violations of the Act. 140
The negligence standard under the CWA provides that a person
must know or "reasonably should have known" that the pollutant
or hazardous substance "could cause personal injury or property
damage" or could cause a "treatment works to violate any effluent limitation or condition in any permit .... "
One notable case involving the government's use of the negligence standard is United States v. Frezzo Bros., Inc. 142 In Frezzo, the
defendants were convicted of willfully or negligently discharging
pollutants from their mushroom composting operation into the
navigable waters of the United States without a permit in violation of the CWA.' 4 3 The defendants argued that the government
failed to prove the negligent discharges alleged in two of the
counts of the indictment. 1 44 In rejecting the defendant's argument, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that
there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the waste
water system was inadequate and therefore, negligently main14 5
tained by the defendants.
V.

STRICT LIABILITY OFFENSES

A minority of environmental statutes are strict liability statutes that do not require mens rea to sustain a conviction." 6
Although the prosecution's burden of proof under the strict liability statutes is lower than that under criminal environmental
statutes requiring mens rea, the strict liability statutes are infrequently used. 14 7 One possible reason for the failure of prosecutors to use the strict liability provisions is that the penalties
provided under these statutes are considerably less stringent
139 33 U.S.C.

§§

1251-1387 (1988).

140 Id. at § 1319(c)(1).
141 Id.

142 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
143 Id. at 1124-25 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 l(a), 1319(c) (1973)).
144 Id. at 1129.
145 Id.

146 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1988) (wrongful construction and removal of structures); Id.
at § 411 (wrongful deposit of refuse, obstruction of navigable waters, use of or
injury to harbor improvements); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-9(i) (West Supp. 1990)
(wrongful transportation of hazardous waste). See also W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra
note 1, at § 3.4 n.l (defining strict liability crimes).
147 See Comment, The Mens Rea Requirements of the Federal Environmental Statutes:
Strict CriminalLiability in Substance But Not Form, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 307, 309 (198889) (discussing reluctance to invoke The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425,

§ 13, 30 Stat. 1121, 1152 (1899) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988)).
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than those imposed under statutes requiring mens rea. 14 8 The Department of Justice, however, has applied these strict liability
statutes where the government does not possess the requisite
proof to convict under statutes requiring some degree of mens
49

rea. 1

Although environmental statutes that criminalize conduct
without a showing of mens rea are limited and infrequently used, it
is important to be aware that these statutes are available to a
prosecutor. In the event that the government does not possess
evidence to support a showing of knowing or negligent conduct,
these strict liability statutes exist as an alternative means to prosecute a person violating environmental statutes.
VI.

THE WILLFUL BLINDNESS DELIBERATE IGNORANCE
DOCTRINE

The doctrine of willful blindness or deliberate ignorance has
created an exception to the requirement that a person have actual knowledge of the material elements of a crime in order to
sustain a conviction. 5 ° The basic premise of this doctrine is that
a person possesses sufficient mens rea to be convicted of an offense requiring knowledge when he or she becomes aware of the
probable existence of a material element of a crime and intentionally fails to make further inquiry.' 5 ' Although there is dispute among commentators, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Jewell 152 determined that a person is
equally culpable whether he acts with actual knowledge or willful

blindness. 1-3
The defendant in Jewell was convicted for knowingly violating the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act
148
149

See Comment, supra note 147, at 310.
In United States v. Marine Shale Processors, Inc., No. 89-60041 (D.C.W.

La. 1989), Marine Shale pleaded guilty to two violations of the Rivers and Harbors
Act and one violation of RCRA. Commentators speculated that the Department of
Justice prosecuted under the Rivers and Harbors Act rather than the CWA because
the Rivers and Harbors Act does not require a showing of mens rea. 20 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 640, 641 (August 4, 1989).
150 G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAw: THE GENERAL PART § 41, at 126 (2d ed. 1961).
151 Id.
Professor Williams states that "[i]f the party has his suspicion aroused but
then deliberately omits to make further inquiries, because he wishes to remain in
ignorance, he is deemed to have knowledge." Id. (citations omitted).
152 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
153 SeeJewell, 535 F.2d at 700. The court stated: "To act 'knowingly,' therefore,
it is not necessary to act only with positive knowledge, but also to act with an awareness of the high probability of the existence of the fact in question. When such
awareness is present, 'positive' knowledge is not required." Id.
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of 1970.154 On appeal, the defendant challenged the jury instruction that allowed conviction based upon evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that Jewell intentionally avoided learning the
1 55
truth so as to not acquire positive knowledge of the drugs.
The court rejected defendant's argument and affirmed the holding of the district court based on the willful blindness jury instruction.156

The court held that to limit the definition of

knowledge to actual knowledge would result in allowing deliberate ignorance as a defense and thereby sanctioning conscious
avoidance of actual knowledge. 57 Additionally, the court noted
that the concept of willful blindness has been accepted by numerous circuit158 courts of appeals as sufficient to establish
knowledge.
In addition to gaining the acceptance of the circuit courts,
the doctrine of willful blindness or deliberate ignorance is supported by both the Model Penal Code 5 9 and the federal model
jury instructions.'
A standard jury instruction for the doctrine
of willful blindness would allow the jury to infer knowledge if the
government could establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the
61
defendant intentionally avoided knowledge.'
The general policy considerations underlying environmental
criminal statutes also support the doctrine of willful blindness or
deliberate ignorance. The goal of environmental statutes is to
protect the environment as well as the public health, safety and
154 Id. at 705 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), 960(a)(1), § 841(a)(1) (1976) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting).
155 Jewell, 535 F.2d at 698.
156 Id. at 699-704. The court determined that the conviction based on willful
blindness or deliberate ignorance was consistent with the general purpose of the
Drug Control Act. Id. at 703.
157 Id. at 703.
158 Id. at 702-03.
159 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) states "When knowledge of the existence of a
particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person
is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes it does not
exist."
160 1 E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 14.09 (3d ed. 1977).
161 The federal model jury instructions on willful blindness provide:
The element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from
proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would
otherwise have been obvious to him. A finding beyond reasonable
doubt of a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment would permit
an inference of knowledge. Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact may be inferred from willful blindness to the existence
of the fact.
Id.
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welfare. A strong enforcement mechanism, including criminal
penalties, is required to effectuate this goal. The criminal penalty provisions of many environmental statutes often would be
frustrated if a defendant was responsible based on only actual
knowledge. In allowing the government to establish knowledge
through a showing of willful blindness, however, the mens rea requirement is further eroded.
Although the doctrine of willful blindness has been accepted
as satisfying the requirement for knowledge, the courts have
been careful to limit its application.16 2 Justice Kennedy's dissent
inJewell provides the framework for criticism of the willful blindness doctrine and enumerates factors that should be taken into
consideration when applying the doctrine. 163 Justice Kennedy
opined that the jury instructions should have incorporated the
Model Penal Code's description of willful blindness.'64 He noted
that a proper jury instruction based on the Model Penal Code
would support a conviction only if there were a high probability
that the defendant was aware of a material element of the offense. 6 5 If the defendant had a subjective belief that the material
66
element did not exist, the jury could not return a conviction.
Justice Kennedy concluded that the instruction favorably recognized by the majority could result in a conviction under a statute
requiring knowing conduct without determining if the defendant
67
possessed the requisite mens rea.1
The court further refined the willful blindness doctrine in
United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. 168 The Court in Pacific
Hide indicated that the government must show that the defend162 See United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir. 1988) (jury instruction on deliberate avoidance of guilty knowledge is inappropriate when evidence
suggests that defendant had actual knowledge); United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d
1319, 1323-24 (9th Cir. 1987) (deliberate ignorance occurs when defendant purposely avoids learning all facts in order to create a defense); United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 188-91 (7th Cir. 1986) (asserting that jurors should be given
instructions in plain language describing the role of intentional avoidance of knowledge); United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that jury instruction in criminal trial for possession of stolen mail was inadequate where court
stated that defendant had requisite knowledge if she either "acted with reckless
disregard" as to whether checks were stolen or made a "conscious effort to avoid
learning the truth").
163 United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 705-08 (9th Cir 1976) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
164 Id. at 707.
165 Id. at 706-07.
166 Id. at 707.
167 Id.
168 768 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1985).
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ant's conduct included a deliberate attempt to not learn material
facts. 169 Because there was no evidence that the defendant's actions reached this level of conduct in Pacific Hide, the conviction
was reversed. 7 0
The defendant in Pacific Hide appealed a conviction for the
knowing failure to properly manage and dispose of capacitors
that contained polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in violation of
the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). 7 ' The jury was instructed that a conviction could be based on an application of the
1 72
doctrine of willful blindness or deliberate ignorance.
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, placed restrictions
on the doctrine of willful blindness, limiting its use to specific
factual situations.' 7 3 The majority indicated that a willful blindness jury instruction is appropriate only when the defendant's argument is based on a lack of actual knowledge and the evidence
adduced at trial indicates that the defendant deliberately endeavored not to determine the relevant facts in an effort to avoid responsibility. 17 Justice Kennedy noted that in the absence of
evidence of the defendant's intentional conduct to avoid the
truth a "jury might impermissibly infer guilty knowledge on
the basis of7 5 mere negligence without proof of deliberate
1
avoidance."'

The foregoing decision reflects Justice Kennedy's concern
that use of a willful blindness instruction in cases involving a deId. at 1098.
Id. at 1098-99.
171 Id. at 1097-98. See 15 U.S.C. § 2615(b) (1982):
Any person who knowingly or willfully violates any provision of section 2614 of this title, shall... be subject, upon conviction, to a fine of
not more than $25,000 for each day of violation, or to imprisonment
for not more than one year, or both.
Id.
172 Pacific Hide, 768 F.2d at 1098. The jury instruction provided in part:
[Y]ou may find that any particular defendant acted knowingly if you
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was aware of a
high probability that the capacitors contained PCBs in concentrations
over 50 parts per million and deliberately avoided learning the truth.
You may not find such knowledge, however, if you find that the defendant actually believed that the capacitors or transformers contained PCBs in concentrations of 50 PPM, or less, or if you find that
the defendant was simply careless.
Id. at 1098.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. (citing McAllister v. United States, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275-76 (9th Cir.
1984)).
169
170
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fendant lacking the requisite culpability, may result in conviction
under a criminal statute that required knowing conduct. Accordingly, the decision in Pacific Hide and Justice Kennedy's dissent in
Jewell provide articuable standards for the content of a willful
blindness instruction.
VII.

COLLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE DOCTRINE

The term "person" in criminal environmental statutes has
been defined to include corporations. 17 6 The ability to prosecute
a corporation as a "person" under the collective knowledge doctrine has reduced the requisite intent necessary to sustain a conviction. under environmental criminal statutes requiring knowing
conduct. This doctrine allows the collective knowledge of a corporations' employees, acquired within the scope of their employment, to be imputed to the corporation. 77 Therefore, a
corporation can be convicted for a knowing violation even
though no one employee has actual knowledge of all elements of
the violation.
The court in United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc. 178 reviewed
the doctrine of collective knowledge as it evaluated T.I.M.E.'s
criminal liability for knowing violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. 179 In one of the most notable collective knowledge
decisions, the court held that a sufficient number of employees
possessed the requisite information, the aggregate of which provided the corporation with knowledge that it had violated the
statutes. 180
176 For example, the Solid Waste Disposal Act defines a person as "an individual,
trust, firm, joint stock company, corporation (including a government corporation),
partnership, association, [s]tate, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a
[s]tate, or any interstate body." 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1988). Other statutes specifically defining corporations as persons for the purposes of criminal penalties include the Federal Insecticide and Fungicide Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(b)
(1988); Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act Of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 406 (1988);
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e)
(1988); Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988); Comprehensive Planning and Community Right to
Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 11049(7) (1988).
177 See 1 K. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 4:05 (1984).

178 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974).
179 49 U.S.C. § 322(a) (1970). This statute was repealed by Pub. L. 95-473,
§ 4(b), 92 Stat. 1466 (1978), and Pub. L. 97-449, § 7(b), 96 Stat. 2444 (1983). The
government alleged that T.I.M.E. allowed drivers to operate motor vehicles in violation of the Federal Highway Administration Regulations that prohibited fatigued
and ill people from driving.
180 T.I.M.E., 381 F. Supp. at 738-39.
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The collective knowledge doctrine was once again applied in
United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., l 1 where the bank was
convicted for failing to file reports as required by the Currency
Transaction Reporting Act.'8

2

On appeal, the bank challenged

the jury instruction that provided that one of the elements of the
crime, the bank's knowledge of the reporting requirements,
could be established based on the collective knowledge of the
bank's employees.18 3 In affirming the instructions, the court of
appeals held that a collective knowledge instruction was consistent with existing criminal law as applied to corporations, and
that the collective knowledge of a corporations' employees is imputed to the corporation. 8 4 Therefore, based on the doctrine of
collective knowledge, the corporation is liable for its employees'
failure to act lawfully.
It is probable that the collective knowledge doctrine will be
applied in environmental prosecutions pursuant to the criminal
penalty provisions in environmental statutes. Therefore, the collective knowledge doctrine will provide the government with another means for enforcing criminal sanctions when no particular
employee of a corporation possesses the requisite mens rea.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The prosecution of individuals and corporations for environmental crimes has been increasing steadily in recent years. As a
result, the courts have been faced with numerous defenses to
these statutes, including the defense that a person did not possess the requisite mens rea to sustain a conviction. Although the
181 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987).

182 31 U.S.C. § 5311-22 (1982).
183 Bank of New England, 821 F.2d at 844. The jury instruction provided in pertinent part:

In addition, however, you have to look at the bank as an institution.
As such, its knowledge is the sum of the knowledge of all of the employees. That is, the bank's knowledge is the totality of what all of the
employees know within the scope of their employment. So, if Employee A knows one facet of the currency reporting requirement, B
knows another facet of it, and C a third facet of it, the bank knows
them all. So if you find that an employee within the scope of his employment knew that CTRs had to be filed, even if multiple checks are
used, the bank is deemed to know it. The bank is also deemed to
know it if each of several employees knew a part of that requirement
and the sum of what the separate employees knew amounted to
knowledge that such a requirement existed.
Id. at 855.
184 Id. at 856.
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statutes under which most environmental prosecutions are
brought contain mens rea requirements, the courts have gradually
diluted these requirements. Therefore, under environmental enforcement statutes requiring "willful," "purposeful" or "knowing" conduct, the traditional concept of mens rea or "guilty mind"
has been significantly eroded to a point that a polluter can be
convicted for possessing merely the general intent to commit the
prohibited act, rather than the specific intent to violate the statute. Moreover, Congress has indicated its intent to allow criminal penalties for environmental crimes based on negligence or
strict liability principles. Finally, the development of the doctrine
of willful blindness and collective knowledge have provided a
method for convicting persons for environmental crimes when
the mens rea required to be convicted for common law crimes is
not present. This trend is certain to continue in light of the
growing public concern for our environment.

